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THEM THAT HAS,' GETS2
Daria Roithmayr*
In 2004, sociologists Robert Sampson and Jeffrey Morenoff published
a remarkable study on the persistence of poverty in Chicago neighbor-
hoods from 1970 to 1990.3 The authors made several important findings.
First, those neighborhoods that were poor in 1970 were almost all poor
twenty years later in 1990.4 Even as poverty rates dramatically increased in
those neighborhoods throughout the period, the neighborhoods' rankings
stayed the same-that is, the poorest neighborhoods in 1970 were also the
poorest in 1990, only significantly more so. Likewise, poverty rates in-
creased most in those neighborhoods that were already poor, and less so in
neighborhoods that did not suffer already from high poverty rates. Over
time, neighborhood rankings remained remarkably stable despite the turn-
over of families and individuals.
5
Second, and not surprisingly, race was closely correlated both to in-
creasing poverty and to a neighborhood's position in the rankings. In 1970
and in 1990, poverty was highest in the neighborhoods that formed the core
of the city's historic black belt: Grand Boulevard, Oakland, Woodlawn and
Englewood to the south, and Garfield Park and North Lawndale along the
* Professor Roithmayr currently teaches at the University of Southern California Gould
School of Law.
1. This draft chapter is part of a larger book project entitled "Locked In Apartheid." The book
develops a theoretical model-the lock-in model of racial inequality- to explain why racial disparities
have persisted even after the passage of civil rights laws that prohibit intentional discrimination. The
model draws on theoretical work from antitrust and complex systems theory that explains how market
monopolies can persist over time, even after the monopolist has stopped engaging in intentional, anti-
competitive activity.
Applied to race, the lock-in model proposes that, just as Microsoft's monopoly has persisted long
after the end of its illegal conduct, so too can white "racial monopoly" persist even in the absence of
intentional discrimination. In outlining the model, the book advances three central and related arguments.
First, during the era of slavery and Jim Crow, whites formed racial cartels (like neighborhood homeown-
ers' associations) to anti-competitively exclude blacks and Latinos from many areas of economic, political
and social life. Owing to this anti-competitive conduct, whites gained a significant monopoly advantage
in housing, education, employment and wealth, among other areas. Second, this early monopoly advan-
tage now has begun to reproduce itself over time, primarily by way of institutional "feedback loops" that
parlay early advantage into continuing and self-reinforcing advantage. For example, white advantage in
wealth and housing may reproduce itself via differential access to well-funded schools. Third, white racial
advantage may now have become locked in place. That is, white advantage may be sufficiently large and
self-reinforcing that blacks and Latinos will not be able to close the gap, absent massive government
intervention. This chapter focuses on the second component of the model. It describes the dynamics of
institutional feedback loops and the role they play in the lock-in model of inequality.
2. Matthew 25:29 (from the parable of the three servants, "To him who hath shall be given and
from him who hath not, shall be take away even what he hath.").
3. Robert J. Sampson & Jeffrey D. Morenoff, Durable Inequality: Spatial Dynamics, Social
Processes and the Persistence of Poverty in Chicago Neighborhoods, in POVERTY TRAps (Samuel
Bowles, Steven Durlauf & Karla Hoff eds., 2004).
4. Id. at 4 (The correlation coefficient for neighborhood poverty rankings and rates from the
year 1970 to 1990 was 87).
5. Id. at 5 (Poverty rates for the average neighborhood studied increased from 11 to 20 percent).
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city's western corridor. The data also suggested a tipping phenomenon:
neighborhoods that initially were at least 40 percent black remained black
and poor or became blacker and poorer.6 Although the presence of Latino
residents was not initially linked to poverty in 1970, over time, the number
of Latinos in a neighborhood increasingly predicted higher poverty rates.
7
Third, certain key institutional structures in a neighborhood were
linked to poverty. The number of homeowners and physical proximity to a
poor black neighborhood were significantly correlated to a neighborhood's
poverty rate. Neighborhoods that had the fewest homeowners and were
located closest to the black belt experienced the most dramatic increases in
poverty rates. These structural features were linked, in turn, to the race of
the neighborhoods' residents.8
Sampson and Morenoff's findings raise several key questions about
the nature of racial inequality. Why does racial poverty persist or increase
over time, even after the passage of anti-discrimination laws? Why are ra-
cial inequalities in housing, education, employment and wealth linked to
residential location and space? Most importantly, how do our institutional
rules-those taken-for-granted rules that govern the workings of the neigh-
borhood, the school house and the workplace-contribute to continuing ra-
cial poverty?
This chapter argues that "positive feedback loops" in institutional
processes play a central role in perpetuating race and poverty.9 In a nega-
tive feedback loop, change in one direction triggers change in an opposite
direction, which usually produces some sort of equilibrium. For example,
in response to a drop in body temperature, humans shiver, in order to heat
the body back up to its normal temperature. In economic markets, when
demand for goods increases, supply goes down, and prices rise. Ultimately
demand slows in response to rising prices, until the price reaches
equilibrium.
In a positive feedback loop, a change in one direction leads to more
change in that same direction. A snowball gathers more snow. The popu-
lation explodes. A bank account accumulates wealth exponentially. Posi-
tive feedback loops amplify earlier conditions because change in one
direction feeds back to produce more change in the same direction. Each
increase leads in turn to further increase, and each decrease produces a
further decrease.
Positive feedback loops play an important but overlooked role in re-
producing historical racial inequality over time. Many of the taken-for-
granted, race-neutral arrangements that structure our contemporary social
6. Id. at 22.
7. Id. at 7-8. 12 (black neighborhoods and Latino trends).
8. Id.
9. Importantly, this chapter does not suggest that individual and intentional discrimination play
a minimal role in persistent inequality. Indeed, evidence abounds that racial steering, redlining and
other forms of intentional institutional discrimination remain a significant factor in explaining racial
disparities. At the same time, this chapter suggests that even if intentional discrimination (both individ-
ual and institutional) were to disappear tomorrow, structural inequality would persist.
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institutions create positive feedback loops, in which the rich get richer and
the poor get poorer. In school districts, local public schools get a big part
of their funding from local property taxes. In workplaces, employers hire
candidates through word-of-mouth informal referrals. In families, parents
who can afford the expense take out home equity loans to pay for their
children's college tuition.
When these feedback loops are set against the historical background
of racial exclusion, they serve to reproduce the racial monopoly power of
slavery and later exclusion. Consider the example of neighborhood capi-
tal-the extra wealth that a household accumulates from the wealth of its
neighbors. One might think of this process as a process that reproduces
class and not race inequalities. But given the country's history, this feed-
back loop serves to reproduce the initial monopoly advantage that whites
acquired by way of early anti-competitive conduct.
More precisely, during the era of exclusion, white real estate boards,
homeowners' associations and private lenders worked together to exclude
certain racial groups from bidding to buy housing. These racial cartels
deployed a range of anti-competitive strategies to create segregated neigh-
borhoods, which concentrated in one space people who earned less income
and wealth and possessed less education (owing to historical discrimination
in employment and schools). 10
Forty years after Congress passed anti-discrimination laws, these seg-
regated neighborhoods now continue to reproduce racial inequality
through the feedback loop of neighborhood effects. The neighborhood in
which a person lives strongly affects her life chances. In turn, her life
chances contribute to the welfare of the neighborhood."1 Deteriorating
neighborhoods can condemn their residents to likely poverty, just as transi-
tional neighborhoods can lift the chances of its residents as the neighbor-
hood rises. The better-off the neighborhood, the better-off the resident,
which in turn makes the neighborhood better-off, etc. In this way, neigh-
borhood effects can reproduce inequality at the level of the neighborhood
over many generations, even in the absence of continuing discrimination.
Like neighborhood effects, most of the feedback loops discussed here
perpetuate disparity without intentional discrimination. After all, whites
may be moving to wealthier, predominantly white neighborhoods not to
flee black or Latino neighbors but to benefit from well-financed schools,
wealthy neighbors and stable property values. Because whites who are
10. See DAVID ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERI-
CAN WORKING CLASS (Verso 1999).
11. See DEIDRE A. ROYSTER, RACE AND THE INVISIBLE HAND: How WHITE NETWORKS Ex-
CLUDE BLACK MEN FROM BLUE-COLLAR JOBS (Univ. of California Press) (2003). Royster's work,
which is discussed later in the this chapter, traced the employment histories of black and white gradu-
ates from the same high school over a period of five years. Over and over, white men looking for work
were helped by older white men in their social networks (fathers, shop teachers, neighbors, friends of
the family) who had connections with unions or employers, while black men had no access to such
connections. Royster's data indicates that social networks, particularly family and neighborhood net-
works, function to reproduce employment stratification along racial lines.
2008]
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looking to trade up are not necessarily motivated by intentional prejudice,
contemporary anti-discrimination law does not prohibit their choices (a
point that Chapter 5 will discuss at length). At the level of the collective
group, however, these choices perpetuate racial inequality.
The rest of this chapter explores the institutional feedback loop in
greater detail. The next section looks at the structure of the institutional
feedback loop, and the underlying theory. The following section outlines
four general categories of feedback loops that reproduce racial inequal-
ity-family transfers of wealth, network effects, space and geography, and
coordination standards.
I. INSTITUTIONAL FEEDBACK Loops: SOME BASIC THEORY
The concept of the institutional feedback loop draws from some fasci-
nating work in complex systems theory. Complex systems theory is an in-
terdisciplinary field that studies the dynamics and structure of complex
systems. Complex systems are made up of individual agents that interact
with each other to produce unpredictable and interesting patterns. These
patterns cannot be understood simply by looking at the behavior of individ-
ual agents. The whole is indeed far more than the sum of its parts. The
world is full of complex systems. Ant colonies, stock markets, families, star
systems, neighborhoods, and sand piles are all amazing examples of
systems.
For example, the ant colony's move to relocate after a flood cannot be
predicted from the behavior of the individual ant, just as the stock market's
complex dynamic patterns cannot be reduced to the behavior of buyer or
seller (or even just the interaction of the two in a Prisoner's Dilemma).
Something distinct happens at the level of the complex system, and com-
plex systems theorists look for rules common to all complex systems to help
explain what that something is. 2
Many complex systems exhibit very similar dynamic patterns. For ex-
ample, complex systems often experience "phase transitions," in which
change is sudden, non-linear and unpredictable. The stock market crashes
and bubbles, even as it moves slowly in other periods. Water boils and then
escapes into steamy vapor. An ant colony suddenly goes into breeding
mode. The racial composition of neighborhoods can change quite rapidly
once the numbers reach a certain threshold or "tipping point."' 3
12. For a highly readable introduction to complex systems theory, including the narrative of the
genre's evolution, see generally WALDROP, COMPLEXITY: THE EMERGING SCIENCE AT THE EDGE OF
ORDER AND CHAOS (Simon & Schuster 1992). For a more technical discussion of the principles of
complex systems, see generally ROBERT AXELROD & MICHAEL COHEN, HARNESSING COMPLEXITY:
ORGANIZATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER (Free Press 2000); for an introduction
somewhere in the middle, see Brian Arthur, Why Do Things Become More Complex?, SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN, May, 1993, at 144.
13. In physical systems, such points are often referred to as phase transitions. For example, when
water moves from frozen form to fluid, the phase transition takes place within the context of a small
increase in temperature. Other complex systems display tipping points, critical thresholds and other
phenomena in which small differences create large changes. A small outbreak of an infectious disease
suddenly becomes an epidemic. The centuries-old practice of foot binding disappears over thirty years.
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This non-linear change is often produced by a dynamic process known
as a positive institutional feedback loop. In an institutional feedback loop,
an initial change to the system produces more change to the system and
moves it in the same direction. When the system's "output" feeds back to
become part of the system's "input," change accelerates over time. In a
compound interest bank account, for example, the account grows dynami-
cally because output (the interest) feeds back into input (the account's cap-
ital) during the next period. Assuming no withdrawals, the account grows
exponentially larger, even in the absence of further deposits.1 4 Likewise,
when the population grows, each new generation feeds back to become the
parents of the next generation.
Brian Arthur uses the mathematical example of the Polya urn process
to illustrate the way in which feedback loops reinforce the effect of earlier
events.15 At the outset, the urn contains only two balls, one red and one
white. For each round of play, an experimenter randomly draws a ball and
then returns it to the urn, together with another ball of the same color as
the ball drawn. Draws and returns proceed until the urn is filled. The key
mechanism-adding another ball of the same color as that drawn-is a posi-
tive feedback loop, because it reinforces the effect of each previous draw,
particularly those early in the process.
In the world of economics, positive feedback loops can take the form
of increasing returns. Neo-classical economists have always assumed that
the economy is governed by negative feedback loops, where the effect of
change is dampened as the system moves toward equilibrium.
As early as the 1950s, however, economists like Gunnar Myrdal and
Nicholas Kaldor described positive feedback loop mechanisms-in Myrdal's
words, "circular and cumulative causation"-that depart from these conven-
tional principles. These scholars, and now a new generation of economists,
have pointed out that certain markets are sometimes characterized by in-
creasing returns, in which market success is cumulative and self-
reinforcing.16
In the context of monopolies, increasing returns can amplify the ad-
vantage of a market monopolist, even after the bad actor has stopped en-
gaging in illegal conduct. Some commentators have argued, for example,
For a very readable description of this particular feature of complex systems, see generally MALCOLM
GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: How LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE (2d ed. 2004).
For a more scientific description of phase transitions, tipping points and critical threshold, see generally
MOSHE GITrERMAN & VIVIAN H. HALPERN, PHASE TRANSITIONS: A BRIEF ACCOUNT WITH MODERN
APPLICATIONS (World Scientific Publishing Co. 2004).
14. See W. Brian Arthur, Increasing Returns and the New World of Business, 74 HARV. Bus.
REV. 100, 102 (1996); Mark Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic
Effects, 86 CAL. L. REv. 479, 500-507 (1998).
15. See W. BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE ECONOMY 6
(Univ. of Michigan Press 1994).
16. GUNNAR MYRDAL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND UNDERDEVELOPED REGIONS X (Harper & Row
1971) (1957); NICHOLAS KALDOR, CAUSES OF THE SLOW RATE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE UNITED
KINGDOM (Cambridge Univ. Press 1966); See also Nicholas Kaldor, The Case for Regional Policies, 17
SCOTTISH J. POL. ECON. 337 (1970).
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that a positive feedback loop reproduced Microsoft's unfair advantage in
the operating systems market even after Microsoft had ceased its anti-com-
petitive behavior. 17 Early in the formation of the market, Microsoft had
engaged in anti-competitive conduct (e.g., bundling, illegal tying contracts
and exclusive contracts), which conferred an unfair competitive advantage
in the operating systems market.
Microsoft's unfair advantage then persisted over time because of an
institutional feedback loop connecting software authors to consumers. Be-
cause software authors wanted to write software for the most popular oper-
ating systems, more software authors wrote programs for Windows as the
system became more popular. In turn, because consumers wanted to buy
the operating system that had access to the widest range of software, any
increase in available software triggered a corresponding increase in con-
sumers. Each increase in software authors triggered an increase in consum-
ers, which in turn, triggered a corresponding increase in software authors,
thereby producing more change. Microsoft's advantage became self-rein-
forcing over time, long after Microsoft had stopped its illegal behavior.
Like the operating systems market, systems with institutional feedback
loops display several characteristic qualities. First, they can be "path de-
pendent." That is, they can be very sensitive to historical events, particu-
larly those that happen early in the formation of the system.' 8 For
example, if early draws in the Polya urn happen by chance (or by manipula-
tion) to be mostly of one color, then the urn may ultimately "tip" to that
color over time.
In an oft-cited example of this idea, economists trace the dominance of
the standard Sholes QWERTY typewriter keyboard to two minor historical
events. First, a number of typing schools decided to use the Sholes key-
board to develop a typing course. Second, a typist using the keyboard
scored a decisive victory in a typing contest in 1888. These relatively minor
events gave the Sholes keyboard a competitive lead in the market, early on
in the formation of the industry. 9
17. For a vigorous defense of Microsoft's conduct, a challenge to the lock-in argument and an
argument that Microsoft's dominance can be traced to a better product, see generally STANLEY J.
LIEBOWITZ & STEVEN E. MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS AND MICROSOFr: COMPETITION AND ANTI-
TRUST IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY (Independent Institute 1999).
18. Scott Page correctly points out that increasing returns do not necessarily lead to path-depen-
dence, monopoly or lock-in. In the event that two or more technologies can take advantage of increas-
ing returns at roughly the same rate, then those technologies may remain competitive with one another,
and small historical events will not necessarily affect market outcomes. Scott E. Page, An Essay on the
Existence and Causes of Path Dependence (unpublished essay, Univ. of Michigan) (on file with
author).
19. See Paul A. David, Understanding the Economics of QWERTY: The Necessity of History, in
ECONOMIC HISTORY AND MODERN ECONOMICS 30-49 (William N. Parker ed., 1986). See also Paul
David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 Am. ECON. REV. 332, 332-34 (1985); Paul David, Why
Are Institutions the "Carriers of History?" Notes on Path-Dependence and the Evolution of Conventions,
Organizations and Institutions, 5 in STRUCTURAL CHANGES & ECONOMIC DYNAMICS 205 (1994). For an
argument against QWERTY as an example of path-dependence, see Leibowitz & Margolis, supra note
17.
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An institutional feedback loop then translated that early lead into a
self-reinforcing advantage. Like the software authors in the Windows ex-
ample, new typists were eager to train on the most popular keyboard. In
turn, employers wanted to buy the keyboard that would give them access to
more trained typists. Each increase in Sholes typists triggered an increase
in employers who bought the keyboard, which thereby persuaded more
typists to train on it, and so on.
Importantly, this process also created barriers to entry for competitor
keyboards. Given limited resources, employers adopted only one kind of
keyboard, and typists were likely to train on only one keyboard as well.
Thus, as more employers adopted QWERTY keyboards, this worked not
just to the advantage of Sholes and Sholes employers and typists, but also
to the disadvantage of competitor keyboards, typists and employers. In
this way, both advantage and relative disadvantage became self-reinforcing
over time. Eventually, the Sholes keyboard monopolized the market.2"
Second, once the system has charted a particular direction, systems
with positive feedback loops may become inflexible. In the Polya urn, once
the urn has begun to tip towards one color, later draws may have very little
effect on the ultimate distribution of balls in the urn. The same idea is
illustrated in the VCR market. In the competition between the Betamax
and VHS video recorders in the 1970s and 80s, small market fluctuations
favored the VHS format manufactured by JVC, even though both Sony
and JVC began with roughly the same market share. After VHS had
gained a sizable lead, the VHS advantage accelerated because video outlets
began to exclusively carry VHS tapes, which made that format even more
popular. Ultimately, the market became inflexible when Beta could no
longer catch up to VHS. 21 At this threshold or "tipping point," we say that
VHS had become "locked in."
Third, markets with feedback loops are potentially inefficient. Be-
cause a product's success is sometimes linked to accidental (or intentional)
advantage, the market can potentially lock in an inferior technology. Some
commentators argue that Betamax is technically superior to VHS, and that
the feedback process has locked in the relatively less efficient format.
22 Of
20. Scott Page has argued that the relative disadvantage or "negative externalities" created by
the QWERTY feedback loop are what drive path dependence, and not positive externalities. See Page,
An Essay, supra note 18. In my view, Page's argument confuses the issue. First, it is the positive feed-
back loop-positive in the sense not that it confers benefits but that it produces movement in the same
direction-that creates both positive and negative externalities. Second, I would argue that in most real-
world cases, both the negative externalities experienced by competitor keyboards and the positive ex-
ternalities enjoyed by QWERTY are incident to the same institutional feedback loop. To be sure, in
the theoretical world, feedback loops could create positive externalities or effects-effects that benefit
one competitor-without creating negative effects on competitors. But practically speaking, in a world
of limited resources, any feedback loop that confers positive benefits on a dominant market player is
likely also to confer negative effects on competitors in the same market.
21. Michael A. Cusumano, Yiorgos Mylonadis, and Richard S. Rosenbloom. Strategic Maneuver-
ing and Mass-Market Dynamics: The Triumph of VHS over Beta, 66 BUSINESS HISTORY REVIEW
51 (1992) see also W. Brian Arthur, Positive Feedbacks in the Economy, 262 Scientific American 92
(1990); Arthur, supra note 14, at 2.
22. Id. at 112.
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course, self-reinforcing dynamics do not necessarily produce an inefficient
or sub-optimal outcome. In fact, self-reinforcing effects might actually
reproduce the advantage of the more innovative alternative, given the right
circumstances.
II. FEEDBACK Loops THAT REPRODUCE RACIAL INEQUALITY
What can monopoly in typewriter keyboards and computer operating
systems teach us about contemporary race relations? Just as institutional
feedback loops have sustained Sholes' and Microsoft's monopoly on the
markets, so too have institutional feedback loops sustained an early racial
monopoly on resources and opportunities. And, like the locked-in monop-
oly that characterizes some high-tech markets, racial disparities appear to
be firmly entrenched and potentially inefficient.
The story of persistent racial monopoly has its beginnings in slavery
and later eras of racial exclusion. As Chapter 2 describes, whites formed a
variety of racial cartels during slavery and afterwards to anti-competitively
exclude certain communities of color. Planters' unions, real estate boards,
neighborhood homeowners' associations, and industrial labor unions
formed to exclude blacks from neighborhoods, employment, schools, and a
wide range of other institutional resources and opportunities. Likewise,
corporate ranches and concerned citizens' councils (as well as many of the
cartels named earlier) formed to exclude Mexicans during the turn of the
century.23 These cartels engaged in a wide range of anti-competitive be-
havior-simple economic pressure all the way through to violence, murder
and property destruction.24 At the end of the era of exclusion, whites en-
joyed a "monopoly surplus" in opportunities and resources-wage premi-
ums from a white monopoly on the best jobs, superior housing at lower
prices from a monopoly on housing, and well-financed schools at lower tax
rates from a monopoly on education, among others.
This chapter argues that four different types of institutional feedback
loop now have parlayed that early competitive advantage into a continuing
advantage: family transfers of assets, geography and legal space, standard
setting and network effects. Family transfers of assets can build on whites'
early material advantage. Owing to exclusion, whites have had more
wealth, and for a longer period of time, than have non-whites. White fami-
lies have been able to invest this surplus to generate wealth for their chil-
dren: making a down payment on a house, paying for college tuition or
setting up a business. Because wealth begets wealth, and because wealth
has been racially defined, racial wealth inequalities persist over time.
Geography and legal space can do a lot to parlay whites' material ad-
vantage as well. Historical segregation concentrated much of whites' early
23. As noted earlier, and as more fully described in Chapter 2, other racial groups did not suffer
the same degree of anti-competitive exclusion as did blacks and Latinos. In addition, other immigrant
groups came with more human capital or actual capital than did either of these two groups.
24. See Chapter 2's discussion of the monopoly strategies deployed by racial cartels during Jim
Crow and slavery.
[VOL. 27:373
THEM THAT HAS, GETS
wealth advantage into distinct geographical spaces. Well-defined white
neighborhoods had the monopoly on wealthy neighbors, stable property
values and public goods like school financing. Because neighborhood ef-
fects translate that early monopoly into continuing advantage, space can
reproduce the segregation surplus acquired during earlier periods of
exclusion.
Likewise, standard setting can serve to reproduce white procedural and
political advantage. During earlier times, white employers and unions fil-
led certain high-wage workplaces with white workers, and whites con-
trolled "the workplace standard" for compatibility. Owing to compatibility
and coordination concerns, employers now have an economic incentive to
"standardize" by hiring workers who will be compatible with existing white
workers. Because whites engaged in bad behavior to become the first mov-
ers in the best workplaces, any standard that promotes compatibility will
continue to favor them.
Finally, network effects can work to reproduce whites' early structural
advantage. Network connections, like social connections in general, pro-
vide access to a wide range of resources and opportunities. Benefitting
from their early monopoly behavior, whites' networks enjoyed far more
resources than non-whites: connections to high-paying jobs, to valuable
commercial information, and to cultural and financial capital, among other
things. Segregated networks of contact now reproduce themselves and the
differences in access to resources.
As the following chapter will discuss, the law plays an important role
in structuring all four feedback loops. For example, estate tax laws regulate
the amount of family wealth that can be passed down to subsequent gener-
ations without being subject to taxation. Zoning law and public school fi-
nance regulations control who occupies what geographic space, and the
type of benefits associated with that space. Anti-discrimination and em-
ployment law regulate the parameters of organizational choices to stand-
ardize. A wide range of law, including employment law, determines what
resources can be distributed through informal networks.
A. Family Transfers of Assets to Generate Future Wealth
Although the racial gap in income has closed very slightly in recent
history, the gap in wealth between races remains huge-seven times
greater than the gap in income. According to recent studies, the net worth
of a typical black family falls between 10 to 20 percent of the net worth of a
white family.25 As of 1999, the typical black family had a net worth of
25. These results hold true in studies that control for income and other factors. See THOMAS M.
SHAPIRO, THE HIDDEN COST OF BEING AFRICAN AMERICAN: How WEALTH PERPETUATES INEQUAL-
try 47 (Oxford Univ. Press 2004); MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH /
WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 7 (Routledge 1997) (reporting 15 per-
cent); Francine D. Blau and John W. Graham, Black-White Differences in Wealth and Asset Composi-
tion, 105 Q. J. ECON. 321, 321 (1990) (reporting 18 percent).
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$8,000, compared to $81,000 for a white family.2 6 Similar figures for 2002
put the average net worth of a Latino family at $7,932.7 Moreover, the
wealth gap for both groups seems to grow much larger during economic
downturns.28
How much of this racial wealth gap can be traced to the white monop-
oly surplus from earlier periods of exclusion? In general, a significant por-
tion of a person's wealth can be traced to family wealth that is passed from
generation to generation. Laurence Kotlikoff and Larry Summers have es-
timated that eliminating inter-generational transfers would reduce U.S.
wealth by as much as 50 percent.2 9 Predictably, these transfers contribute
quite a bit to the modern racial wealth gap, particularly because the very
wealthy make very big transfers, and the very poor make very small trans-
fers, if they make transfers at all.3"
Recent research by sociologist Dalton Conley has confirmed that fam-
ily transfers play a big role in reproducing the racial gap. Conley's study
looked at data from several generations to determine how much of the
racial wealth gap could be explained by differences in parental net worth.
After controlling for a number of other potential explanations, Conley
found that racial differences in parental wealth accumulated over time, and
these differences were the most important factor in explaining the contem-
porary racial wealth gap.31
Economist James Curtis has traced the source of the black-white
wealth gap even further back to the accumulation of historical wealth dur-
ing slavery. Curtis's research compared historical racial differences in
wealth before the end of the Civil War to modern racial differences in
wealth. Curtis's study made two important findings. First, wealth differ-
ences among blacks in the years between 1860 to 1870 could all be ex-
plained by legal status-whether the person in question was free or
enslaved. Second, modern wealth differences between blacks and whites
could be traced to the compounding growth rate of wealth passed from
26. See SHAPIRO, supra note 25, at 47.
27. Rakesh Kochhar, The Wealth of Hispanic Households, 1996-2002, Pew Hispanic Center Rep.
2 (October 2004).
28. Dalton Conley, Decomposing the Black-White Wealth Gap, 71 SOC. INQ. 39 (2001) (citing to
Oliver and Shapiro).
29. Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Lawrence H. Summers, The Contribution ofIntergenerational Trans-
fers To Total Wealth: A Reply, (NBER Working Paper No. 1827) (Feb. 1986) (reviewing evidence accu-
mulated after 1981); See also Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Lawrence H. Summers, The Role of
Intergenerational Transfers in Aggregate Capital Accumulation, 89 J. POL. ECON. 706, 730 (1981) (in-
tergenerational transfers are the "major element determining wealth accumulation" in the U.S.; elimi-
nating intergenerational transfers would reduce wealth by $3 trillion).
30. See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 25, at 169 (wealth transfers matter most at the top and
bottom of wealth spectrum).
31. Conley's analysis controlled for income, occupation, age, family structure, education and a
host of other demographic variables that might affect an individual's net worth. DALTON CONLEY,
BEING BLACK, LIVING IN THE RED: RACE, WEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY IN AMERICA 47 (Univ. of
California Press 1999).
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generation to generation. Like Conley, Curtis concluded that initial histor-
ical differences in wealth during the era just after slavery are responsible
for much of the modern racial gap in wealth.32
Passing down family money reproduces disparity in a variety of ways.
This section considers two types of intergenerational transfers in particular:
first, parental help to make a down payment to buy a house, which gener-
ates more wealth via home equity, and second, parental help with college
tuition, which boosts a child's future earnings and wealth as well.
Home ownership is a significant part of family wealth, mostly because
home equity appreciates over time. By some estimates, home equity
makes up more than a third of a household's non-pension wealth.33 But
racial gaps in wealth distribution exist here as well. Although home equity
wealth gets more evenly distributed than, say, stocks or trusts, huge racial
gaps in rates of home ownership. The 2000 Census reports that 71 percent
of whites owned homes, but only 46 percent of black and Latino house-
holds were homeowners.34 Other research reports a similar race gap in
home equity.
What explains these racial differences? Economists Kerwin Charles
and Erik Hurst have argued that racial differences in getting help with the
down payment can explain a big part of the gap. The authors note that 27
percent of whites get parental help in making a down payment to purchase
a house, compared to only 7 percent of blacks.3 ' According to their re-
search, a full 25 percent of the racial gap in home ownership can be ex-
plained by the racial differences in parental help.36
The amount of help varies between races as well.37 Not surprisingly,
families who cannot get down payment help are less likely to even apply
for mortgages, even when they have sufficient income to make the monthly
payments.38 Alternatively, they buy homes later than those who get assis-
tance, thus losing valuable time to enjoy equity appreciation. Other re-
search suggests that racial differences in inheritance (which often are
connected to the family home) also contribute to wealth inequality.39
Thus, getting help with buying a house can make a big difference in
the wealth of racial groups over time. The racial gap in down payment
32. James Curtis, Long-Run Differences in Wealth Among Blacks and Whites: Empirical Results
from Structural Regression Decomposition 18 2001 ANN. MEETING OF THE SOC. SCIENCE HIST. ASS'N
MEETINGS, Chicago, Illinois.
33. Erik Hurst, Ming Ching Luoh, & Frank P. Stafford, The Wealth Dynamics of American Fami-
lies, 1984-1994, 1 Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity (1998).
34. Census of Housing, Homeownership by Race and Hispanic Origin, (2000).
35. Kerwin Charles and Erik Hurst, The Transition to Home Ownership and the Black-White
Wealth Gap, 84 REV. ECON. & STATISTIcs 281,295 (2002). Thomas Shapiro estimates that 46 percent of
whites get assistance in some form, versus 12 percent of black families. SHAPIRO, supra note 25, at 112.
36. See Charles & Hurst, supra note 35, at 295.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 292.
39. Suzanne D. Withers & Carolina Reid, Racial Differences in Intergenerational Wealth Trans-
fers and Access to Homeownership, Annual Meetings of the Population Association of America
(Philadelphia).
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assistance is further aggravated by the fact that wealthier homeowners own
bigger houses on more desirable property, and thus accumulate even more
wealth.4" Making the gap even larger, white homeowners were uniquely
able to take advantage of the dramatic rise in home values during key his-
torical periods, including the 1970s. 4"
Beyond helping with down payments, families also help their children
pay for college tuition, which also serves to generate future wealth. As
anyone who has priced college tuition knows, in college financing, a fam-
ily's wealth matters far more than its income. Indeed, in an era when col-
lege costs have skyrocketed, families frequently take out home equity loans
or draw on other financial assets to pay for college.42
Here again, however, social science evidence documents a big racial
gap in family ability to help with college tuition. Dalton Conley's research
has looked at the link between parental wealth and college attendance. In
particular, Conley examined racial differences in parental wealth and post-
secondary education; completing a baccalaureate degree; and completing a
graduate degree. In dissecting racial differences, Conley found that family
wealth was strongly linked to whether a person pursued a post-secondary
education and completed an initial undergraduate degree, although less so
for the graduate degree. According to his study, doubling of parental as-
sets raised the probability of a child going to college by 8.3 percent, and the
likelihood of graduating by 5.6 percent. Conley found that after controlling
for parental wealth and other class characteristics, blacks were actually
more likely than whites to continue on to college.43
Of course, family members provide a very important source of social
capital to enable people to accumulate wealth. Beyond paying for college
or the down payment on a house, family members often choose residential
location and help children to find their first job. As the next several sec-
tions will discuss, neighborhood choices and job help from network connec-
tions represent other types of positive feedback loops.
B. Geography and Space: Neighborhood Effects
A second type of feedback loop reproduces inequality through geogra-
phy and space. Space is important not just because the physical organiza-
tion of space or its intrinsic characteristics-nearness to a river or natural
resources-but also because of the bundle of legal and social benefits that
become linked to that space. In the last decade, experts have begun to
study the feedback loops that connect geographic space to industry location
and economic growth. Economists Paul Krugman and Brian Arthur have
argued that a firm's to migrate to a city is influenced not just by its physical
40. Charles & Hurst, supra note 35, at 284.
41. OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 25, at 148.
42. CONLEY, supra note 31, at 58.
43. Dalton Conley, Capital for College: Parental Assets and Postsecondary Schooling, in SOCIOL-
OGY OF EDUCATION 59, 66-68 (2001) (reporting an advantage of .23 to .32 years of schooling). See also
CONLEY, supra note 31, at 68 (reporting the same result for high school attendance and completion).
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characteristics, but also by the firm's prospective neighbors-i.e., the earlier
location choices of other firms.
The presence of good neighbors adds a great deal to the attractiveness
of a location. For example, having other high-tech neighbors in Silicon Val-
ley might also mean having a ready supply of skilled labor and transporta-
tion infrastructure. These neighborhood benefits are self-reinforcing.
Each new "good neighbor" makes it more likely that the place will attract
other good neighbors, at least until the area gets too crowded or competi-
tive." Thus, industrial location choices can be self-reinforcing.
Neighborhood effects work not just for industrial neighbors but for
residential neighbors as well. Legal scholar Lee Fennell notes that choos-
ing a residential location includes not just the physical structure (the resi-
dence) of the location, but also a basket of other neighborhood
amenities-a particular set of neighbors, and a particular basket of local
public goods both from one's own jurisdiction and from others nearby. (For
example, a certain residential location might offer so-so public schools and
easy driving distance to workplaces nearby.) Fennell also notes that the
basket of neighborhood amenities is not an ala carte menu: a resident has
to take all of the amenities associated with a particular space, and cannot
divide them up. She also notes that these neighborhood amenities can in-
clude not just benefits but liabilities as well.
This basket of benefits and liabilities, which the literature refers to as
"neighborhood effects," often affects the wealth of future generations, and
not just that of the immediate family. Parents choose a neighborhood with
an eye toward the future, and for good reason. Research on the Gautreaux
Assisted Housing Program examined the effect of moving 7100 black re-
sidents to wealthier white suburban neighborhoods. The results of the
study confirm that living in a "good neighborhood"-with wealthy neigh-
bors, well-maintained property, good security services and good
schools-generates additional wealth for the individual family and future
wealth for children, particularly in terms of attending college and getting
good jobs. Living in a "bad" neighborhood with concentrated poverty
often means the loss of opportunity and a cycle of disadvantage, both for
the neighborhood and the individual residents.45
Scholars have studied the effects of a wide variety of neighborhood
effects: local public finance, income distribution in the neighborhood, and
neighbors' property improvements, to name a few."6 These studies confirm
44. Paul Krugman, History and Industry Location: The Case of the Manufacturing Belt, 81 AM.
ECON. REV. 80 (1991); Arthur, supra note 14, at 49-67.
45. Leonard Rubinowitz and James Rosenbaum documented the results from the Gautreaux As-
sisted Housing Program, which moved over 7,100 black families to the Chicago suburbs as part of a
consent decree. These scholars found that for those families who moved to the suburbs, 54 percent of
the children from those families enrolled in college, versus 21 percent of the control group who used
their Section 8 benefits to stay in the city. Recent follow-up research has confirmed that these differ-
ences have persisted. LEONARD RUBINOWITZ & JAMES ROSENBAUM, CROSSING THE CLASS AND
COLOR LINES: FROM PUBLIC HOUSING TO WHITE SUBURBIA (Univ. of Chicago Press 2000).
46. For studies looking at public finance, see Steven Durlauf, Neighborhood Feedbacks, Endoge-
nous Stratification and Income Inequality, in DYNAMIC DISEQUILIBRIUM MODELING (W. Barnett, G.
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several important points. First, a family's welfare is closely tied to that of
the neighbors. Research finds, for example, that a child's success in school
depends heavily on what her classmates are like, and in particular their
socio-economic status.47
Second, neighborhood effects operate to sort neighborhoods over
time. More specifically, differences in neighborhood amenities tend to sort
neighborhoods by housing price, rental price, local property taxes and zon-
ing barriers (which impose minimum price requirements). Neighborhood
effects like public expenditure also tend to sort neighborhoods by race.
The following discussion focuses on public school financing, to explain how
neighborhood differences can persistently stratify neighborhoods by race.
As any family looking to buy housing (or real estate broker) can tes-
tify, people pay very close attention to schools and school finance in choos-
ing where to live. Homeowners who are not parents pay attention because
of the effect of schools on property values. Those who are parents pay
attention because they know that going to the "right school" will help to
determine their children's future success.
Why is going to the right school essential to a child's future? The an-
swer seems obvious. Well-funded schools do a better job at improving the
cognitive skills of students, and employers are more likely to hire a candi-
date who has better skills. But good schools can make a difference to fu-
ture wealth in many other ways. First, graduating from a good school
(which presumably requires more work in class or at home) signals that a
job candidate cares about status, and will try to excel, or at least try to
avoid being fired.48
Second, going to school in a middle-class white neighborhood signals
that the job candidate has been socialized according to the norms of behav-
ior characteristic of the white middle-class community. Employers might
find this important if the workplace is already predominantly white and
Gandolfo & C. Hillinger eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996); Steven Durlauf, A Theory of Persistent
Income Inequality, 1 J. OF ECON. GROWTH 75 (1996); Raquel Fernandez & Richard Rogerson, Income
Distribution, Communities and the Quality of Public Education, 111 0. J. OF ECON. 135 (1996); Thomas
Nechyba, Existence of Equilibrium and Stratification in Local and Hierarchical Tiebout Economies with
Property Taxes and Voting, 10 ECON. THEORY 277 (1997). Durlauf's work also included the effect of
neighborhood distribution of incomes on the productivity of educational expenditures. Karla Hoff and
Amartya Sen's study examined the way in which the value of a home is affected by expenditures of the
neighbors. Karla Hoff & Anjit Sen, Home-Ownership, Community Interactions and Segregation, World
Bank (2000).
47. See Mark Dynarski, Robert Schwab & Ernest Zampelli, Local Characteristics and Public
Production: The Case of Education, 26 J. URBAN ECON. 250 (1989); Charles F. Manski, Educational
Choice (Vouchers) and Social Mobility, 11 ECON. OF EDUC. REV. 351, 356 (1992).
48. Bowles and Gintis have argued that, in affecting the life-chances of students, well-financed
schools do far more than to provide superior training in cognitive skills. Attending and completing
school signals to the employer that the student has an appropriate discount rate for time-that she is
oriented toward the future and will act so as to avoid termination and keep her job. Attendance also
signals other traits-deference to authority, fear of failure, leadership and degree of trust. Finally,
schools influence which cultural models children are exposed to. Particularly when cultural values vary
from the traits of parents, schools can function to spread cultural traits that would not otherwise prolif-
erate. See SAMUEL BOWLES & HERBERT GiNTis, SCHOOLING IN CAPITALIST AMERICA REVISITED (Ba-
sic Books 2001).
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middle class, for reasons that are explored in the next section.49 And at-
tending a good school increases the likelihood that the graduate has poten-
tially useful business connections. The right school means marketable
skills, the right work ethic, the right social skills and the right connections.
At least one author has argued that education has replaced family lineage
as the new currency of status.50
Several scholars have studied the dynamic relationship between public
school finance and persistent residential segregation."s According to re-
search by economist Roland Benabou, the "neighborhood effects" of pub-
lic school finance are so strong that even small differences in public school
financing can sort neighborhoods by income and by race over time, even if
the neighborhoods are initially mixed.52
Benabou's economic model starts with two neighborhoods that have
an equal proportion of rich and poor families. If education spending in
Neighborhood A becomes slightly higher than Neighborhood B, the land in
A becomes more valuable, and so the price of housing in A rises. The
wealthier families in B now are more likely to move to A to take advantage
of the good schooling and appreciating property values. The mix of neigh-
bors left behind in B, in turn, is now relatively poorer, and education
spending likely will decrease. Another round of defections ensues, with the
relatively wealthier families departing, until land in A becomes too expen-
sive for anyone in B to purchase. Owing to this feedback loop, even minor
differences in education spending can cause neighborhoods to stratify by
income over time. Moreover, these forces can slow down or even reverse
any income convergence between rich and poor.
So much for the theoretical model. What happens in real life, when
neighborhoods do not begin equally mixed, but have been racially and eco-
nomically segregated for a long time? In Benabou's view, given the coun-
try's lengthy history of racial segregation, racial disparities might now be
just too great to overcome because of self-reinforcing feedback loops. Ra-
cial discrimination during Jim Crow and slavery allowed wealthier whites
to "capture" the benefits of their racial monopoly, in two ways. First,
whites enjoyed the benefit of buying into good neighborhoods at artificially
lowered prices. Under the regulation of Jim Crow laws and informal social
norms, blacks were not allowed to bid on land to which white families
moved. This exclusion artificially decreased land prices for the benefit of
49. See id.
50. See DAVID BROOKS, BOBOS IN PARADISE: THE NEW UPPER CLASS AND How THEY GOT
THERE (Simon & Schuster 2001).
51. See Dennis Epple and Richard Romano, Competition Between Private and Public Schools,
Vouchers, and Peer Group Effects, 88 AMER. ECON. REV. 33 (1998); Rachel Fernandez and Robert
Rogerson, Income Distribution, Communities and the Quality of Public Education, 111 Q. J. EcoN. 135
(1996).
52. Roland Benabou, Equity and Efficiency in Human Capital Investment: The Local Connec-
tion, 63 REV. OF ECON. STUDIES 237, 238 (1996); See also Roland Benabou, Human Capital, Inequality
and Growth: A Local Perspective, 38 Eur. Econ. Rev. 817 (1994).
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whites, particularly in the suburbs, but also in urban white
neighborhoods. 3
Second, now that non-whites are permitted to buy into any neighbor-
hood without regard to race, those home buyers who move into white
neighborhoods pay full value to buy in, unlike white residents, who were
able to buy in at lowered prices. Moreover, even those whites who are
buying into a new neighborhood for the first time will enjoy an advantage
over non-whites. Namely, whites who grew up in all-white neighborhoods
with better-funded schools have benefitted from a racial monopoly surplus.
White families have enjoyed the higher income and wealth that accompany
attending better-funded schools and the higher property values that accom-
pany neighborhoods with better-funded schools.54 When whites buy into a
new neighborhood in order to trade up, they can draw on that monopoly
surplus to pay the bill; blacks and Latinos cannot.
Benabou notes that this public school finance feedback loop works in
only one temporal direction, as is often true with feedback loops. Namely,
once neighborhoods have become stratified by race and class, dismantling
the feedback loop becomes far more difficult to do without producing bad
results, like the racial displacement that comes with gentrification. As
Benabou remarks,
[S]tratification is likely to be much harder to undo once it
has occurred than it is to stop [it] in its tracks early on. Due
to the cumulative nature of the process, the amount of
transfers required to induce the first few rich families to
come back is considerably larger than what it would have
taken to make them stay in the first place."
C. Coordination Standards for Future Distributions
Being the first group to populate a profession or an industry or a
school does not just mean a material head start. It also means that the
group can potentially control the standards for coordination and compati-
bility in the workplace or the classroom, in a way that favors the incum-
bents. Accordingly, the advantage of being the first-mover monopolist can
reproduce itself indefinitely into the future.
53. Beyond the self-reinforcing advantage to whites that historical monopoly conferred, blacks
also suffered accompanying disadvantage in their ability to pay for housing in segregated neighbor-
hoods. According to historian Arnold Hirsch, blacks paid more to buy housing in segregated neighbor-
hoods, largely because supply was restricted to a smaller geographic space. At least in the rental
market, blacks paid 15 to 50 percent higher rent than whites paid for similar accommodations. See
ARNOLD HIRSCH, MAKING THE SECOND GHETrO (1998).
54. See Benabou, supra note 52, at 247.
55. Id. at 257.
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In the economics and antitrust literature, standard setting focuses on
the question of who controls the standards that govern uniformity, coordi-
nation and compatibility. Much of a product's value derives from its com-
patibility with other components of a system. For example, the value of a
microprocessor derives in large part from its "vertical" compatibility with
an operating system, hardware (printer, keyboard, monitors) and software
applications.56 Likewise, the value of a compact disk or videocassette
player comes from being able to play as wide a range of CDs or videotapes,
from as many different sources as possible.
Often, competitors choose to offer "competing standards" rather than
compete head-to-head within the same standards. In the VCR wars, Sony
and JVC decided to offer two different formats-VHS and Beta. They
might have chosen instead to make their video recorders compatible with
each other, and to compete within the parameters of a common standard,
much as Sony and Phillips did when they agreed on a standard for CD
players.
Standards are primarily valuable because they facilitate communica-
tion and connection. In their work on standardized "boilerplate" contract
terms, Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner suggest that using a standard-
ized term confers three types of benefits: (a) lawyers need less time to for-
mulate a precise term and will make fewer errors; (b) lawyers are more
certain about the meaning of the term because prior judicial opinions have
provided background information; and (c) lawyers can communicate with
other members of the relevant contractual community-lawyers, con-
tracting parties, and judges-because the term facilitates a shared under-
standing about the parties' meaning and intent. Speaking the standard
language with other parties is one of the most important functions of a
contract.58
Compatible products and products that communicate well with other
products or users are more valuable on the market. Thus, a firm that acts
anti-competitively in order to control the standard can have an extremely
profitable market position-sometimes referred to as an "architectural
franchise"-because the firm can monopolize compatibility profits.59 This is
particularly true when some barrier (like patent law or a steep learning
curve) prevents competitors from making use of the standard.
Accordingly, antitrust law pays attention to standards because they are
potentially susceptible to manipulation and can thereby reduce competi-
tion. If a firm manipulates the market to control the standard, consumers
56. Mark Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1041,
1048 (1996).
57. Stanley M. Besen & Joseph Farrell, Choosing How to Compete: Strategies and Tactics in
Standardization, 8 J. EcoN. PERSPECTIVES 117, 121, 126 (1994).
58. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Con-
tracting, 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997). See also Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in
Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347
(1996).
59. See Besen and Farrell, supra note 57, at 119.
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may lose variety. For example, in an industry where IBM-compatible ma-
chines are the standard, Apple computers offer a number of capabilities
that are not available on IBM-compatible machines. IBM compatibility is
not a formal standard-it is rather a "de facto" standard that allows for
some competition by Apple. Nevertheless, many a person has succumbed
to the demands of an IBM-compatible world by replacing an Apple com-
puter with a PC.
Indeed, Mac users at the Johnson Space Center in Houston had to
organize an agency-wide campaign to delay the switch from Macs to PCs.
Johnson administrators had authorized the switch on grounds that John-
son's computers needed to be compatible with the rest of NASA and the
country. The agency had adopted a Windows standard in 1995, much to the
chagrin of those rocket scientists in computer-aided design (CAD) and en-
gineering, who argued that the Mac was much more suited to tasks in their
fields. Workers organized and complained to Johnson administrators about
the impending agency-wide change. After the IG's intervention, the space
center put a hold on its plans to make the switch.6°
D. Coordination and Compatibility in the Workplace
What do standards and the Mac vs. PC wars have to do with racial
inequality? We can analogize standards for interoperability in the high-
tech area to standards for compatibility in the workplace. In both settings,
the ability to work together and communicate is key. Just as a monopolist
can set the "standard language" for compatibility in high-tech markets, so
too can racial cartels set the standard for coordination and compatibility in
areas like employment. Likewise, just as standardizing can produce a self-
reinforcing first-mover advantage in personal computers, so too can stan-
dardizing the workplace reinforce an early Jim Crow first-mover advantage
for whites.
In the workplace, compatibility has much to do with demographics.
Demographic diversity affects the compatibility of members on a work
team and their productivity levels in a number of ways. First, diversity af-
fects the quality of workplace communication. Research by organizational
theorists suggests that corporate management teams made up of people
who are demographically and culturally similar are likely to develop a
shared language that reflects similar experiences, backgrounds, beliefs and
values. This shared standard language-and the shared view of the world
that language reflects-improves communication among team members,
both in terms of how often they communicate and how effectively.61
60. See Big Mac Attack: Apple Users at NASA Say Switch to PCs Doesn't Compute, HOUSTON
Bus. J. Aug. 9, 1996.
61. Margarethe F. Wiersema & Karen A. Bantel, Top Management Team Demography and Cor-
porate Strategic Change, 35 ACAD. MANAGEMENT J. 91, 95 (1992). This study looked at age, organiza-
tional tenure, team tenure and education. Socio-linguists sometimes refer to this shared language as
"restricted code," to describe the "shortcuts" people take in communicating with others who collec-
tively share common background knowledge. assumptions, mental models, experiences and views of the
world. See BASIL BERNSTEIN, CLASS, CODES AND CONTROL (Schocken Books 1975).
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Conversely, demographically mixed groups communicate less often and
less effectively.62
Second, diversity affects the level of interpersonal relationship conflict
in the workplace. Mixed work teams experience more conflict around is-
sues not directly related to the task at hand, but having to do with interper-
sonal matters. Demographic differences in social categories-race, gender,
age-can generate animosity, tension and annoyance (sometimes overtly
race-related, sometimes not) among members in a mixed group. In turn,
animosity, tension and annoyance inhibits team performance because
group members are less able to assess information from others, are more
emotional and are less receptive to ideas of others. Likewise, increased
conflict funnels time and energy away from the task and toward resolving
the conflict.63
Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati have explored the legal and organiza-
tional implications for these arguments about compatibility. In part, they
note that because of the pressure to standardize, firms tend to choose ap-
plicants of color whose experiences, perspectives and approaches most
closely resemble those of whites. Of course, they note that blacks, Asians
and Latinos have had far less success in assimilating to white norms, given
the larger differences in family history and experiences that exist for these
groups than for white ethnics. Carbado and Gulati argue that the law tends
(improperly) to use "assimilated" minorities as the baseline for measuring
discrimination.'
At the same time, social category diversity can sometimes improve a
team's performance, particularly on tasks that require innovation and crea-
tivity. A number of studies have found that diversity improves perform-
ance on tasks that require searching through a large number of alternatives
or problem solving creatively. 65 Diversity promotes divergent thinking, by
bringing other perspectives, viewpoints and experiences to the table, which
improves creativity and problem-solving. Diverse perspectives and exper-
iences provide a wider range of "searchable space" in which to look for
answers to problems.66
So what is the bottom line with regard to race? Does racial diversity
diminish performance and productivity or not? Recent research has pro-
duced mixed results. Much of the research suggests that the effect of race
in the workplace depends on the kind of tasks that work teams are asked to
perform. For routine, simple "exploitation" tasks, in which teams are
asked to exploit an existing set of skills as efficiently as possible, diversity
62. Harry Triandis, Cognitive Similarity and Interpersonal Communication in Industry, 43 J. AP-
PLIED PSYCH. 321 (1959).
63. Karen A. Jehn, A Multimethod Examination of the Benefits and Detriments of Intragroup
Conflict, 40 ADMIN. SCIENCE Q. 256, 259 (1995).
64. Devon Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE
L.J. 757 (2003).
65. See id. at 261.
66. SCoTr PAGE, THE LOGIC OF DIVERSITl (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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can reduce performance.67 Because single race work teams can share a
common set of experiences, and usually suffer from fewer interpersonal
conflicts, racially homogenous work teams may be more productive than
racially mixed teams.
In contrast, for more complex "exploration" tasks, in which teams are
asked to explore potential strategies for organizational change or assess
long-term organizational needs, studies indicate that racial diversity can ac-
tually improve performance.68 So, for example, in setting the future direc-
tion of a very innovative high-technology company, racially diverse work
teams may be more creative.
Importantly, however, diverse creativity comes at a cost. Employers
must take into account the risk and the cost of diminished performance.69
Likewise, the employer often must pay to manage the potential interper-
sonal conflict that comes with racial diversity. 7 Without effective manage-
ment, conflict may diminish the performance of a strategic work team even
as diversity improves performance in other ways. To be sure, this last cost
may well be acceptable for those teams that are engaged in "exploration"
tasks, because these diverse teams will produce more if they are managed
effectively. In contrast, costs associated with diversity may be less accept-
able for companies that specialize in more exploitation tasks-e.g., an indus-
trial factory that does not need to update its technology frequently.
Information problems about potential diversity benefits may hamper a
firms' ability to forecast in the long run. Research shows that all organiza-
tions pay less attention to the potential longer-term benefits of diversity
and more to short-term. Benefits from creativity and innovation are more
uncertain and are only realized over time. As a result, organizations char-
acteristically focus more on the immediate costs of diversity as opposed to
67. For the research on the productivity of heterogenous work teams, see Karen A. Jehn, Clint
Chadwick and Sherry M. B. Thatcher, To Agree or Not to Agree: The Effects of Value Congruence,
Individual Demographic Dissimilarity and Group Conflict on Workgroup Outcomes, 8(4) INT'L J. CON-
FLICT MAN. 287 (1997). See also Valerie I. Sessa, Why Team Demographics Have an Influence on Team
Effectiveness: Conflict as a Mediating Variable (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Academy
of Management, Atlanta, GA (1993)). James March draws the distinction between exploration and
exploitation tasks. Exploration includes search, experimentation, variation, innovation, discovery and
risk taking. Exploitation involves refinement, implementation, execution, production, efficiency. James
G. March, Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning, 2 ORGANIZATION SCIENCE 92
(1991).
68. Lisa H. Pelled, Kathleen M. Eisenhart, & Katherine R. Xin, Exploring the Black Box: An
Analysis of Workgroup Diversity, Conflict and Performance, 44 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 1 (1999) (looking at
race, age and tenure).
69. Richard Epstein makes the point that heterogeneous groups increase costs because their
preferences diverge, and it will cost the employer to develop a set of collective decision-making
rules-governance costs-to manage divergent preferences. Moreover, the employer will bear the cost
of managing the dissension that remains after a decision is made, particular for winner-take-all deci-
sions. RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAWS 61-69 (Harvard Univ. Press 1992). In Epstein's words, "[i]t is harder to do business as social
distance between persons increases." Id. at 66.
70. Charles A. O'Reilly, Katherine Y. Williams & Sigal Barsade, Group Demography and Inno-
vation: Does Diversity Help? in RESEARCH IN THE MANAGEMENT OF GROUPS AND TEAMS (Elizabeth
Mannix & Margaret Neale eds. 1997).
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longer-term benefits. 71 Thus, firms might undervalue the benefits of
diversity.
In sum, because of the costs associated with diversity, standardizing
reproduces whites' early monopoly advantage of being the first-mover.
Chapter 2 discusses in great detail the conduct of white labor unions, pro-
fessional associations and guilds to specifically exclude blacks and Latinos
from employment, especially in professional and high-wage jobs. These
workplaces filled up exclusively with white employees and workers, which
makes it more likely that in the future, employers will hire white workers.
Standardizing may favor those racially defined first-movers, even as it pro-
duces certain efficiencies in the workplace. The following chapters will dis-
cuss the dilemmas that mostly white firms face when they decide whether
to make the switch to a more diverse workforce.
E. Network Effects
A fourth type of feedback loop reproduces white advantage: network
connections. "Network effects" are the benefits and disadvantages that
flow from network connections. In network markets, the value of a prod-
uct can flow from the number of users connected in a network. For exam-
ple, the value of a telephone is largely derived from the number of other
people whom one can dial up. Similarly, but perhaps less intuitively, the
value of a VCR comes in part from the number of "network suppliers" of
videotape -your favorite rental store, the library, and your network of fam-
ily and friends.
Some economists have argued that network effects facilitate a natural
monopoly for networked products, because the first firm to market such a
product can often tip the market in their favor before competitors really
have an opportunity to attract users. 72 Others have noted that, for the ille-
gal monopoly, network effects can reproduce inequality, even when the
monopolist has stopped acting illegally. The Department of Justice's case
against Microsoft was based on a version of the network effects argument.
Thus, legal scholars in the field of high-tech antitrust have paid a fair
amount of attention recently to network effects.7 3
In social networks, as in telephones, the value of a professional con-
nection often derives from the resources that the connection can make
available. Network connections can hook a person up to several different
kinds of resources. First, "who they know" is most often important be-
cause of what they have (and can make available). Network connections
71. See JAMES MARCH, supra note 68, at 73.
72. See ARTHUR, supra note 14.
73. See Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813 (1998)
(discussing network effects in norm dynamics). A number of authors have been less convinced of the
operation of network effects. See LIEBowrrz & MARGOLIS, supra note 16; Stanley Liebowitz and
Steven Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, 8 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 133 (1994);
Mark A. Lemley and David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L.
REV. 479 (1998).
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can make available money or other forms of material resources.74 Second,
network connections are also important because of "what they know"-
network connections can disseminate information. For example, network
ties can pass along information about job openings, or pass on tips about
the important social symbols and rules that govern a particular cultural set-
ting ("cultural capital"). A network contact can advise a new worker about
the power brokers on the plant floor, or about the custom of making deci-
sions behind closed doors. Indeed, recent research suggests that gossip
among members of a network can pass along valuable information about
organizational norms.75
Third, network connections can influence people by shaping their pref-
erences or decisions, sometimes more coercively than others. For example,
employers can be talked into hiring someone by the person's network
referees, who go to bat for the candidate. Likewise, employees can be
pressured by their connections into conforming to company policy.76 Fi-
nally, network connections can provide a person with a sense of well-being
and esteem, prompting some researchers to argue that social networks
form for this very reason.77
Social and institutional networks distribute group capital not only
across space but also across time. Networks can function to pass along
wealth, opportunities, information and influence to successive generations.
The following section focuses in particular on the racial divide in social
networks and employment.
F. Job Search Networks
Informal referral networks play a key role in distributing jobs, particu-
larly high-wage and professional jobs. Sociologists like Mark Granovetter
have demonstrated that employers fill well over half of all jobs via personal
referrals, although the number is slightly lower for black job candidates
than for white.78
What makes job networks effective? Why do people participate in
these networks, particularly when they have nothing immediate to gain?
Job referral networks distribute a number of benefits to network members.
74. Alejandro Portes, Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology, 24 ANN.
REv. Soc. 1, 4 (1998).
75. David S. Wilson, Gossip and Other Aspects of Language as Group-level Adaptations, in COG-
NITION AND EVOLUTION (Charles Heyes and Lawrence Huber eds. 2000).
76. Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu defines social capital as the pool of actual or potential resources
that are linked to membership in a network of acquaintance or recognition. Pierre Bourdieu, The
Forms of Capital, in HANDBOOK OF THEORY AND RESEARCH FOR THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION 248,
(JG Richardson ed. 1985).
77. Nan Lin, Building A Network Theory of Social Capital, 22 CONNECTIONS 28, 31 (1999).
78. Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. Soc. 1360, 2371 (1973) (reporting
in a study of professional, managerial and technical workers that over 56 percent of employees found
their jobs through references from social contacts). See also MARK S. GRANOVETrER, GETTING A JOB:
A STUDY OF CorrAcrS AND CAREERS 11 (1995). Truman Bewley has prepared a survey of research on
the percentage of jobs filled via network contacts. TRUMAN F. BEWLEY, WHY WAGES DON'T FALL
DURING A RECESSION (Harvard Univ. Press 1999).
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Well-connected job candidates can search through a larger network space
for potential job openings, to increase the likelihood of employment. Em-
ployers use network referrals because the referees will screen in advance
prospective candidates for skills, diligence, efficiency, employability, and
compatibility with current workers.79 Referees participate because refer-
ring a new employee stores up goodwill and political capital with both the
candidate and the employer, to be retrieved at a later time.8° Because the
referee, the worker and the employer will gain benefits, all have an incen-
tive to use the network.
Not surprisingly, race rears its head in network connections. Compar-
ative studies show significant racial differences in the types of jobs that
people get through their job referral networks. According to work by
Diedre Royster and Mercer Sullivan, white men entering the workforce get
lots of help from older men in their social networks-shop teachers, fathers,
neighbors and friends of the family frequently help on the job search, par-
ticularly if the candidate is looking for entry level work or an apprentice-
ship in high-wage trades jobs that are unionized. Blacks and Latinos, by
comparison, have far fewer older men in their social networks who are able
or willing to serve as a network referral for steady, high-wage employment.
Indeed, when compared to whites and Latinos, blacks have the fewest net-
work connections to industrial and trade occupations.81 Thus, the type of
jobs embedded in networks differ significantly by race.
Research reveals a number of other important racial differences in so-
cial networks. First, blacks and whites have referral networks that differ in
density-the number of connections that each person in the network pos-
sesses. Density is very important in making a network effective. Referral
networks will cease to "hang together" if the number of connections to
people with jobs drops below a critical density. Above this threshold, re-
ferral networks have enough links between people to function properly.
Below the critical number, the network literally disintegrates and falls
apart.
Fragmented networks cause huge problems for racial groups. Without
effective networks, whole communities can become so isolated from high-
wage jobs that members are perpetually unemployed.82 Work by Kenneth
Arrow and Ron Borzekowski indicates that, because of networks' critical
threshold, even very small differences in the number of ties can induce iso-
lation and substantial income inequality across racial lines.83
79. See Roger Waldinger, Network, Bureaucracy, Exclusion, in How THE OTHER HALF WORKS:
IMMIGRATION AND THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF LABOR (Univ. of Cal. Press 2003).
80. See James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, 94 AMER. J. Soc. 95,
108 (1988).
81. See ROYSTER, supra note 10; MERCER L. SULLIVAN, GETTING PAID: YOUTH CRIME AND
WORK IN THE INNER CITY (Cornell Univ. Press 1989).
82. Lisa Finneran & Morgan Kelly, Social Networks and Inequality, 53 J. URnB. EcoN. 282 (2003).
83. Kenneth J. Arrow & Ron Borzekowski, Limited Network Connections and the Distribution of
Wages, Staff Working Paper prepared for U.S. Federal Reserve Fimance and Economics Discussion
Group (August, 2004); See also James Montgomery, Social Networks and Labor-Market Outcomes:
Toward An Economic Analysis, 81 AMER. ECON. REV. 1408 (1991).
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Second, racial differences affect the strength of the network connec-
tion. Most scholars agree that the strength of network ties affects the net-
work's function, and that race is related to the strength of network
connections. Interestingly, they do not agree on whether strong ties or
weak ties are more effective. One school of thought, represented by the
work of sociologist Nan Lin, argues that, at least in the case of more mature
workers, strong ties increase a person's chances of connecting to people
who have the authority to influence hiring decisions.84 To ask someone in
power to intervene in a hiring decision, the job candidate must have a fairly
strong relationship to the decision maker, or must know someone who
knows the decision maker quite well.
Lin argues that blacks and Latinos may not have social networks with
sufficiently strong ties to persuade decision makers to act on the candi-
date's behalf. Royster's work confirms this notion. In her study, although
white and black male students took classes from the same high school shop
teachers, the white shop teachers were far more likely to ask white students
to do work on the side for them, or to put them in touch with the union
foreman or some other person in high authority when job seeking.
An alternative school of thought, made famous by the work of sociolo-
gist Mark Granovetter, argues that weak ties actually work better because
weak ties will pass along information that differs from what the candidate
and her close circle already have." Because weak ties are usually people
who are not connected to each other, a network of weak ties may provide a
bridge across the disconnected segments of a network, called "structural
holes."86 Bridging the structural holes gives a candidate a much wider
searchable space for job prospects.
Empirical research on racial differences seems to indicate that blacks
and Latinos may be less successful on the job market because their net-
works are smaller and their ties stronger. Without a large network of weak
ties, these groups cannot search as productively across structural holes.87
Whether because their network ties are too weak or too strong, networks
operate less effectively for people of color than they do for whites.
Why is it that social networks do not become integrated? Even in the
absence of overt racism, networks remain segregated because like tends to
attract like (social psychologists call it "homophily").88 In addition, social
contacts take place in the context of social institutions -neighborhoods,
84. Nan Lin, Walter M. Ensel, & John C. Vaughn, Social Resources and Strength of Ties: Struc-
tural Factors in Occupational Status Attainment, 46 AMER. Soc. REV. 393 (1981).
85. See GRANOVETTER, supra note 78, at 52.
86. RONALD S. BURT, STRUCTURAL HOLES: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF COMPETITION (Harvard
Univ. Press 1995). Structural holes can create a competitive advantage for a person whose relationships
bridge the holes or gaps. Holes provide this individual an opportunity to control the flow of information
between the disconnected parts of the network. NAN LIN, SOCIAL CAPITAL: A THEORY OF SOCIAL
STRUCTURE AND ACTION 70-71 (Aldine Transaction 2001).
87. James D. Montgomery, Social Networks and Labor-Market Outcomes: Toward an Economic
Analysis, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 1408 (1991).
88. See LIN, supra note 86, at 66.
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schools, workplaces-that tend to be segregated for reasons already dis-
cussed. It is hard to say whether the architecture of social networks would
look different if history had been different. Resources attached to those
networks might well be much more equally distributed if they had not been
so stratified early on.
All four of these institutional feedback loops contribute to persistent
racial inequality. In each loop, whites have parlayed their early monopoly
advantage into continuing advantage. More generally, feedback loops help
to explain why whites' material well-being consistently ranks above the
well-being for non-white groups, and blacks and Latinos in particular. Pre-
vious chapters have explained that these groups started out with dramatic
initial differences in their levels of wealth. Using the compound interest
bank account analogy, whites and non-whites began with very different ini-
tial deposits. Even if we assumed that the compound interest rate for both
groups was the same, the feedback loops described above reproduce early
advantage into continuing advantage because whites and non-whites began
with very different levels of initial assets, owing to discrimination.
But some evidence indicates that the compound interest rates them-
selves might differ significantly between groups. Research on class mobil-
ity indicates that a mobility gap exists between blacks and whites. In a
nationally representative study, economist Tom Hertz discovered big mo-
bility differences between blacks and whites at all levels of parental in-
come, and particularly large differences in the wealthiest brackets. For
example, Hertz found that 30 percent of white children born to the top
tenth of the country's wealthiest people remain in the top ten percent, com-
pared to just 4 percent of black children.
At the other end of the spectrum, only 17 percent of white children
born to the poorest ten percent of the population stay in that bottom
bracket, compared to 42 percent for black children. Hertz documents that
ten times as many black children remain in the bottom decile as at the top.
In contrast, twice as many white children remain at the top decile as remain
at the bottom.89 This research helps to explain why racial poverty persists
even though average black and white incomes have converged slightly in
past years. More broadly, the research indicates that differences in the
feedback loops themselves, and not just the initial historical asset differ-
ences between groups, contribute to persistent inequality.
III. EMERGENCE
Contemporary anti-discrimination law defines racism as the choice
made by an individual person to intentionally exclude someone on the ba-
sis of an irrational stereotype. But the institutional feedback loop and the
concept of "emergence" demonstrates how institutional processes can
89. Tom Mertz, Rags, Riches and Race: The Intergenerational Economic Mobility of Black and
White Families in the United States, in UNEQUAL CHANCES: FAMILY BACKGROUND AND ECONOMIC
SUCCESS (S. Bowles, H. Gintis & M. Osborne eds. forthcoming).
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shape social patterns separate and apart from individual behavior. Racial
inequality can "emerge" when people who are following race-neutral rules
interact with each other.
The concept of emergence is drawn from complex systems theory, to
explain how complex and unpredictable social patterns can emerge from
individual agents who follow very simple rules. For example, in an ant col-
ony, individual ants' behavior is governed by very simple rules like "follow
the pheremone trail of the ant in front of you." The individual investor
follows the simple rule "buy low, sell high."
In comparison, the behavior of the ant colony and the stock market is
far more complex. For example, ant colonies will relocate after a flood and
move to higher ground. Contrary to popular lore, the colony's good sense
to move after a natural disaster comes not from some direction to evacuate
by the ant queen, but rather from the complex interaction of ants who are
just following very simple rules of behavior. The stock market also demon-
strates complex behavior-bubbles, crashes and free-falls on occasion-that
cannot be predicted from or reduced to individual choices.
Likewise, racial inequality can emerge from group behavior even when
individuals are following race-neutral rules of behavior. Our discussion of
feedback loops helps to explain how that happens. At the level of individu-
als, people are following simple, race-neutral rules-like "move to a new
neighborhood if your neighbors are wealthier and it has a well-funded
school " or "hire new employees through people you already know." At
the level of the collective, however, given the country's history, they are
interacting in ways that reinforce historical racial inequality. Given histori-
cal patterns and arrangements, the racial inequality can emerge from the
interaction of actors without bias.
IV. AN AGENT-BASED MODEL
In a forthcoming project, Derek Robinson and I have developed an
agent-based model to demonstrate the self-reinforcing nature of institu-
tional feedback loops. Our model shows how neighborhood effects can
work to reproduce residential segregation.90 In this model, black and white
families (or "households") engage in two primary activities during each
"generation" or iteration. First, households acquire wealth. In particular,
they accumulate wealth from two sources. Initially, a portion of each
household's wealth comes from their "inheritance" from the previous gen-
eration. In addition, the remainder comes from added social capital that
90. See Daria Roithmayr & Derek Robinson, An Agent Based Model of Residential Segregation
and Fair Housing Law (draft on file with author). Agent based modeling is a method used by complex
systems theorists to represent the interactions of individual agents in a complex system according to
simple rules of conduct. The computer simulation permits the modeler to set initial conditions and then
to run the model to simulate dynamic evolution. See Robert Axelrod, Advancing the Art of Simulation
in the Social Sciences, in SIMULATING SOCIAL PHENOMENA (Rosario Conte, Rainer Hegselmann &
Pietro Terna eds. 1997).
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they acquire from their neighbors.91 (This social capital is meant to reflect
a wide range of neighborhood capital, including the value of public schools
and of access to job referral networks). Second, households move to more
attractive neighborhoods. Families are allowed to move under two condi-
tions: first, if a move will help a household "trade up"-i.e., if the new
neighbors are on the average wealthier than the old neighbors,92 and sec-
ond, if the household is wealthy enough to buy into the new
neighborhood.93
As is detailed in the Appendix to this chapter, the simulation takes
place in two periods of play. During the first period, the period of segrega-
tion, black households are not permitted to move into white neighbor-
hoods. At the beginning of this period, white households are assigned
more initial wealth than black families, to reflect the dramatic differences
between black and white families after the end of slavery and Jim Crow.9 4
During the second period, the period of legal integration, all households
can move into any eligible vacancy, subject only to financial constraints and
not to racial restrictions. Importantly, for both periods of play, households
have no preferences about the race of their neighbors.
Figure 1 below demonstrates the location of black and white house-
holds at the beginning of the first period of simulation. Black households
(represented in blue) represent 20 percent of all households. Households
are randomly located in each racial neighborhood. Each area contains an
equal mix of rich and poor households along wealth curves, but the median
FIGURE 1: INITIAL HOUSEHOLD LOCATIONS
AT THE BEGINNING OF SIMULATION
91. Asset accumulation for each family increases each generation by 5% of the previous genera-
tion's assets, and by 3% of the average assets from neighbors. See Appendix A-1, infra.
92. Whether the neighborhood is sufficiently attractive is determined by assessing whether the
average neighbor's assets are at least fifteen per cent greater than the moving family's assets. See id.
93. Whether a family can afford to move into the neighborhood is determined by whether the
family's assets are greater than or equal to the average of neighbor assets. See id.
94. Black families are assigned 60% fewer initial assets than white families, to reflect disparities
in wealth that existed at the end of Reconstruction. See id.
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wealth for white households is significantly larger than for black
households.
During the first period of play, households accumulate wealth and
move around. Segregation of neighborhoods affects the rate of wealth ac-
cumulation for white and black households. Because white households
have more initial wealth relative to blacks, white households will pass down
more wealth to their children and grandchildren. As importantly, because
blacks are not permitted to move into wealthier white neighborhoods, and
because their neighbors are poorer, black households generate less social
capital from their neighborhoods than do wealthier white households.
Figure 2 shows the household locations of blacks and whites after the
first period of play, at the end of legal segregation. This frame indicates
that some poorer white households have moved into black neighborhoods,
but owing to the rules, no black households have been permitted to move
into white neighborhoods. Wealth differences between the races become
more pronounced.
FIGURE 2: HOUSEHOLD LOCATIONS AFrER INITIAL
SEGREGATION PERIOD
During the second period, that of legal integration, wealth accumula-
tion and movement continue. Blacks are now permitted to move close to
whites, subject to their ability to buy a house in the neighborhood.
Figure 3 below shows the household locations after this subsequent
period of legal integration.
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FIGURE 3: HOUSEHOLD LOCATIONS AFTER LEGAL
INTEGRATION PERIOD
Figure 3 demonstrates that, although a few more white households
have moved into black neighborhoods, and a few black households have
moved to the outer edges of white neighborhood clusters, most if not all
residents are still living in relatively segregated neighborhoods, despite the
lifting of legal segregation rules.
Multiple runs of this simulation demonstrate than in twenty-four out
of twenty-five runs, households remain largely segregated by both race and
wealth. Black households are not able to move into neighborhoods with
white families in any significant number, because they are unable to afford
the relatively more expensive housing prices. In one out of twenty-five
runs, owing to random luck and the optimal distributions of wealth and the
dynamics, black families are able to integrate well into the white
neighborhood.
The agent-based model provides a useful way to visualize the self-rein-
forcing nature of institutional feedback loops. More specifically, with re-
gard to neighborhood effects, the model demonstrates how de jure
segregation on the basis of race can become locked in place through an
emergent evolutionary process, even in the absence of intentional
discrimination.95
V. OTHER GROUPS, OTHER HISTORIES: HISTORY AND
FEEDBACK Loops
Somewhere in the description of the lock-in model, someone inevita-
bly raises the question of other racial groups. Why weren't Asians and
Jews also affected by racial cartels and by self-reinforcing institutional
feedback loops? How were they able to escape the ghettos?
95. The Appendix contains relevant programming information and initial parameter settings for
the model.
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Chapter Two makes the important point that historical differences in
the kind and degree of anti-competitive activity may explain the differences
in contemporary well-being among groups. As that chapter makes clear,
segregation for blacks and Latinos has always been significantly more se-
vere than for other groups, and in particular for Jews and many Asian
groups (Chinese, Japanese and Korean, but not Laotians, Hmong,
Cambodians and Thai, for whom segregation is dramatic).
Beyond differences in anti-competitive exclusion, historical differences
in the nature and duration of institutional feedback loops may also explain
relative degrees of success. For example, although so-called "ethnic ghet-
tos" existed for other racial groups besides blacks, they were never homog-
enous. Even in ghettos that were publicly identified with a particular
group, the enclave usually contained a wide range of nationalities, and a
wide range of wealth and capital. In addition, a significant number of
members of those groups lived outside the ghetto, in contrast to blacks at
the turn of the century, most of whom lived in a deeply segregated
neighborhood.
Likewise, the duration of the self-reinforcing feedback loop has dif-
fered significantly among groups. For example, ethnic enclaves proved
fleeting, in comparison with the black ghetto. Segregation fell significantly
for European immigrants after 1910 for a number of reasons, much of
which had to do with a formation of white ethnic identity in reaction to the
increasing in-migration of blacks.96 In contrast, segregation for blacks and
Latinos persisted right up until Congress enacted fair housing laws, and
persist even today.
Finally, historical differences in initial levels of wealth for immigrants
(for example, high levels of human capital and wealth for Jews, Japanese,
Korean, and some waves of Chinese immigrants) may also explain those
differences. 97 Because self-reinforcing processes reinforce the magnitude
of even small events, these historical differences in initial wealth and in the
nature and duration of feedback loops may well explain the significant dif-
ferences among racial groups that currently exist.
VI. OUT OF THE Loop: THE NATURE OF SELF-REINFORCING
INEQUALITY
The simulation illustrated above shows graphically how patterns of
race and class inequality can be produced by the dynamics of a complex
system. The locked-in patterns visible in Figure 3 in particular show that
racial inequality can persist even after white racial cartels have stopped all
intentional discriminatory behavior.
96. See DOUGLAS MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAL APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND
THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 3233 (1993).
97. See, e.g., Deborah Malamud, The Jew Taboo: Jewish Difference and the Affirmative Action
Debate, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 915 (1989) (arguing that Eastern European Jewish immigrants came with a set
of labor skills in the garment industry that matched to particular service needs in the U.S. economy, and
that Jews were able to find work in the civil service sector, an area of employment not open to blacks).
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As the product of complex systems, persistent monopolies in both race
relations and the market share three very important characteristics. First,
both are path dependent. Microsoft's early illegal conduct explained its
later advantage in the operating systems market. Likewise, early historical
events like segregation and slavery have played a central "evolutionary"
role in explaining why blacks and Latinos continue to lag behind whites on
almost every measure of economic well-being. Given how massive the
events of slavery and Jim Crow were-more like a fire or flood than a small
random event-one might argue whether the phenomenon is really one of
path dependence. At the same time, path-dependence is a concept quite
useful in explaining how history has forever changed the path of contempo-
rary race relations.
Second, as the next chapter will discuss in more detail, just as
Microsoft's monopoly in operating systems may have become locked in,
racial inequality may now be locked in place. Most available evidence sug-
gests that, forty years after the passage of civil rights legislation, racial dis-
parities have diminished very little over time in key areas like housing,
wealth, education and employment.98 The concept of self-reinforcing feed-
back loops helps to explain the persistent racial gaps in material well-being.
Third, just as self-reinforcing market monopolies can be potentially
inefficient, so too can persistent racial inequality create social arrange-
ments that are potentially inefficient for all. Earlier, this chapter referred
to evidence that diversity actually improves performance when work teams
are asked to solve problems or to innovate. Political scientist Scott Page
has done some work comparing the problem solving efficiency of two
groups: one made up of those agents who performed best when asked to
solve the problem in isolation, and the other a random group of problem
solvers. 99 Contrary to intuition, Page's random group of agents performed
consistently better in problem-solving than the group of the best agents.
98. Recent research indicates that, contrary to popular perception, racial gaps are quite persis-
tent and robust. See WILLIAM A. DARITY & SAMUEL L. MYERS, PERSISTENT DISPARITY: RACE AND
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY SINCE 1945 (1998). For example, a recent study suggests that the diminution of
the racial gap in earnings is illusory, and wages between blacks and whites are not converging. This
paper argues that earlier literature is flawed because it has excluded non-earners from the calculus. See
Amitabh Chandra, Is The Convergence of the Racial Wage Gap Illusory? 1-5, 21-36 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, NBER Working Paper No. 9476, 2003). See also DARITY & MYERS, supra, at 4372.
Likewise, recent groundbreaking research confirms a stable and substantial gap in education test scores,
and argues that this gap is almost wholly attributable to the quality of schools. See Roland Fryer &
Steven D. Levitt, Understanding the Black-White Test Score Gap In the First Two Years of School, (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, NBER Working Paper No. 8975, 2002). To be sure, controversy exists over
the question of permanence. Some studies indicate that racial gaps are closing, albeit slowly. See e.g.,
EDWARD WOLFF, RACIAL WEALTH DISPARITIES: IS THE GAP CLOSING? 5 (Levy Econ.
Inst., Public Policy Brief No. 66, 2000) (estimating that it will take another 72 years to close the wealth
gap at current rates); THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 6 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith
Phillips eds., 1998) (earnings gap and education gap are narrowing slowly). Even in this literature,
however, scholars acknowledge that some aspects of the gap are quite persistent. See id. at 154, 167
(documenting that blacks continue to be grossly underrepresented in the upper tails of distribution, and
gaps in social science achievement are not narrowing at all). In addition, this research confirms that
much of contemporary disparity is explained by cumulative disadvantage. See Wolff, supra, at 5.
99. Scorr PACE, supra note 67.
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Page's work suggests that collective difference and not "individual merit"
offers more in terms of creativity and innovation, particularly as the global
economy moves to more innovative enterprises.
What can government do to dismantle the lock-in process? As subse-
quent chapters will discuss in far more detail, government must modify
structural feedback loops in some way to reduce their force, or completely
dismantle them. For example, in public school finance, government can
intervene to centralize funding away, and to decouple the loop between
wealth and geography.
Likewise, governments can also design a "no exit" strategy to reduce
white flight based on school funding differences. Political subdivisions like
the city of Portland have moved to ensure that all school districts in a re-
gional area desegregated by race and wealth, so that no school district of-
fers a wealthier and whiter option to which families can flee.
Alternatively, the institutional feedback loop can be used in reverse to
reinforce positive change. Moving a region's poorest families into the
wealthiest neighborhoods can capitalize on the self-reinforcing effect of
neighborhood benefits. A number of regions have moved to require that
affordable housing be located in the wealthiest neighborhoods possible,
and to require that affordable housing "crossfertilize" a mix of income and
race among neighborhoods.'00
Relatedly, the idea of critical threshold suggests that in some circum-
stances, government interventions must be sufficiently big-far bigger than
one would expect-to reverse cumulative advantage and disadvantage. For
example, studies suggest that to significantly reduce the performance gap
between poor and non-poor students, school districts should give poor stu-
dents two to two-and-a-half times the funding for non-poor students, and
should use the money to fund improvements in teacher quality and reduc-
tions in class size. 01' Sometimes one must add a lot of heat before water
will boil. Likewise, sometimes, government must bring significant re-
sources to bear to reverse the spiral of disadvantage. On the other hand, if
a complex system is operating just under some critical threshold, govern-
ment may need to add only a little heat to make the water boil and produce
significant change.
VII. REFRAMING INEQUALITY: FROM INDIVIDUAL TO INSTITUTIONAL
The story of the institutional feedback loop does not answer many of
the important questions about persistent racial disparity. Is racial inequal-
ity merely the story about who got there first? How far back should one go
to look at early anti-competitive conduct? Weren't the key historical
events those that came much earlier - perhaps as Jared Diamond suggests,
100. Myron Orfield, [Vanderbilt Article, new draft]. On file with the author.
101. Kevin Carey, Education Funding and Low-Income Children: A Review of Current Research,
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, (November 2002).
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the early ability of certain communities to domesticate certain plants and
get a head-start on food production?
10 2
Although the feedback loop does not help us to answer those ques-
tions, the concept of self-reinforcing institutional disparity gives us a new
framework within which to frame these questions. The metaphor of self-
reinforcing monopoly seems to better fit with our intuitions about racial
inequality - that three hundred years of slavery and segregation do explain
a lot of current race gaps, that the racial composition of one's neighbor-
hood makes an economic difference in people's lives, that it "takes money
to make money," and that is why "the rich get richer and the poor get
poorer."
Perhaps more importantly, the feedback loop story helps us to under-
stand how racial inequality can emerge from institutional processes that
operate independently of individual actors. By reframing inequality as a
structural and institutional phenomenon, and not just as an individual one,
policymakers can better wrestle with the possibility of social change that
actually eliminates persistent racial disparities. The following chapters ex-
plore the remedies for eliminating self-reinforcing disparities in more
detail.
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Neighborhood type: Moore Neighborhood of Range 2
Mean Black Assets: 40
Standard Deviation Black Assets: 20
Mean White Assets: 100
Standard Deviation White Assets: 40
Number of Iterations to Mobility Change: 20
Family Asset Accumulation Rate Per Iteration: 3%
Neighborhood Asset Accumulation Rate Per Iteration: 5%
Number of Sites Searched to Find Suitable Space: 50
Percent Open Space: 35%
Mutation Rate: .001 percent mutate to assets within S.D. 50
Rules for Moving:
(1) First Period Constraint: Black Families may not move into posi-
tions with any white neighbors
(2) All Periods, All Families: Move When New Neighborhood Aver-
age Assets are at least 15% greater than Old Neighborhood Average As-
sets Family Assets are greater than or equal to New Neighborhood
Average Assets
(3) Activation: Randomized, Asynchronous: Starting with a random
Family, each Family is given opportunity to move once per iteration; All
families move when possible.
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